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Ausili: Denny v. Ford

RAMIFICATIONS OF
DENNY v. FORD MOTOR CO.
PeterJ. Ausili*
I. INTRODUCTION

In Denny v. FordMotor Co.,' on certified questions from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the New
York Court of Appeals held, in a personal injury products

liability action for defective design, that claims for strict liability
and breach of implied warranty are not identical, and that jury

findings against the defendant manufacturer on a breach of
implied warranty claim but in favor of the defendant on a strict
products liability claim are theoretically reconcilable.' There had
been indications in an earlier Court of Appeals' opinion that the
claims had become substantively indistinguishable. 3 However, in
Denny, the court recognized for the first time, that "consumer
* Peter J. Ausili is a law clerk to United States District Judge Leonard D.
Wexler of the Eastern District of New York. He was an associate with Weil,
Gotshal & Manges and Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler in New
York City. His practice has included commercial litigation and white-collar
criminal defense. He graduated magna ciun laude from St. John's University
School of Law in 1989 and was Notes & Comments Editor of the St. John's
Law Review. Mr. Ausili is a member of the Eastern District's Committee on
Civil Litigation and an active member of the Suffolk County Bar Association
(SCBA), where he is Co-Chair of the Labor & Employment Law Committee,
former Co-Chair of the Federal Court Committee, Assistant Legal Articles
Editor of the SUFFOLK LAWYER (an SCBA publication), and an Officer of the
SCBA's Academy of Law. Mr. Ausili has lectured extensively on federal
courts and federal practice and has published various articles on federal courts
and federal practice in the SUFFOLK LAWYER and NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL.
He also frequently lectures and writes on other topics, such as products
liability and legal writing. The author would like to thank Kevin 0. Fales,
Esq., of New York City, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
1 87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1995) (ruling on
certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd
Circuit).
2 Id.
3 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 345, 253 N.E.2d
207, 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490, 494 (1969).
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expectations" analysis determines "defect" in a breach of implied
warranty claim for personal injury in a products liability action
for defective design.4 By contrast, the court confirmed that riskutility analysis determines "defect" in a strict products liability
claim for defective design.' Consumer expectations, the court
held, require inquiry only into whether the product was fit for its
ordinary purposes, without consideration of feasible alternative
designs. Risk-utility analysis, on the other hand, requires a
weighing of the product's dangers against its overall advantages,
with a consideration of feasible alternative designs.
Although the Denny opinion, by recognizing a distinction
between the claims, seemingly revitalized the breach of implied
warranty claim--and consumer expectations analysis, it indicated
that the distinction, "as a practical matter, may have little or no
effect in most cases." Nevertheless, an important concern for
lawyers (and their clients) is determining when the claims may
both be asserted and separately charged to a jury and when,
instead, the two claims are sufficiently similar that only one
charge to the jury suffices.
First I will discuss the Denny case and the seemingly revitalized
breach of implied warranty claim--and consumer expectation
analysis. Then I will discuss the recent Second Circuit opinion in
Castro v. QVC Network, Inc.,6 construing and applying Denny.

Finally, I will discuss various practical and substantive
considerations of asserting or opposing a breach of implied
warranty claim.
II.

DENNY V. FORD MOTOR Co.

A. The Denny Case and Majority Opinion
Plaintiff Nancy Denny was injured when her Ford Bronco II, a
four-wheel drive small utility vehicle, rolled over when she

Denny, 639 N.Y.2d at 259, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
1 Id. at 260, 662 N.E.2d at 740, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
6 139 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998).
'
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slammed on the brakes to avoid a deer in the road. 7 She and her
husband sued Ford Motor Co., the vehicle's manufacturer,
asserting claims for negligence, strict products liability, and
breach of implied warranty of merchantability.' The case was
tried in October 1992. 9
The trial evidence focused on the characteristics of "small"
utility vehicles-down-sized versions of traditional utility
vehicles, which are generally made for off-road use on uneven
terrain.1" Plaintiffs' evidence showed that small utility vehicles,
and particularly the Bronco II, have significantly higher risk of
rollover accidents than do ordinary passenger vehicles."
Specifically, plaintiffs showed that the Bronco II had a low
stability index due to its high center of gravity and relatively
narrow track width, and that its shorter 2 wheel base and
suspension system contributed to its instability. '
Ford argued at trial that these design features were necessary to
the Bronco II's off-road capabilities. 3 Ford contended that the
Bronco II was intended as an off-road vehicle and had not been
designed to be sold as a conventional passenger vehicle. 4 Ford's
engineer testified that he would not recommend the Bronco II for
use as a passenger vehicle, since the features of a four-wheel
drive utility vehicle were not helpful for that purpose and the
vehicle's design made it inherently less stable.' 5
However, the plaintiffs argued that Ford marketed the Bronco
II as particularly suitable for commuting and for suburban and
city driving. 16 In support, plaintiffs introduced a Ford marketing
manual which provided that a sales presentation should reflect the
Bronco H's "suitab[ility] for commuting and for suburban and
7 Dewzy,

8 id.

87 N.Y.2d at 251, 662 N.E.2d at 731, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 251.

9Id.
0
1

Id. at 252, 662 N.E.2d at 731-32, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52.

" Id. at 252, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
12

Id.

13Id.

14 id.
15 Id.
16Id.
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city driving," and that the vehicle's ability to switch between
two-wheel and four-wheel drive would "be particularly appealing

to women who may be concerned about driving in snow and ice
with their children.' 17 Indeed, the manual predicted that many
buyers would be attracted.to the Bronco II because utility vehicles
were "suitable to contemporary life styles" and were "considered
fashionable" in some suburban areas.' 8 The plaintiffs testified
that they were attracted to the Bronco II for the perceived safety
benefits of its four-wheel drive capacity and were not interested
in its off-road use. 9
The district judge, over Ford's objection, submitted both the
strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims to the jury."
The jury ruled in Ford's favor on the strict liability claim, but in
plaintiffs' favor on the breach of implied warranty claim,
awarding her $1.2 million.2 ' Ford appealed.

On appeal, Ford argued that the jury's verdicts on the strict
liability claim and the breach of implied warranty claim were
inconsistent because the claims were identical.' Moreover, Ford
contended that the contractually-based breach of implied warranty
claim had been subsumed by the "more recently adopted, and
17Id.
18 Id.
19Id.

Id. at 253, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
Id. at 254, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253. The court also
charged the jury on plaintiffs' negligence claim. On the verdict form, the jury
found Ford was negligent in "designing, testing and marketing the Bronco II,"
but found that the negligence did not proximately cause Mrs. Denny's injuries.
Denny, 42 F.3d at 109-10. However, the jury found that Ford was not
negligent in failing to provide adequate warnings. Id. at 110. Thus, plaintiffs
lost on their negligence claim. Apparently, plaintiffs did not assert a claim for
strict liability based on failure to warn. On the strict liability claim based on
defective design, the jury found that the Bronco II was not "defective",
thereby disposing of that claim. Id. However, the jury proceeded to find that
Ford had breached its implied warranty and that the breach was the proximate
cause of Mrs. Denny's injuries. Id. The jury then found that Mrs. Denny was
negligent and that her negligence contributed to her injuries by 60%. Id. The
jury fixed the plaintiffs' compensatory damages at $3,000,000. and declined to
award punitive damages. Id.
2 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 253, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
20

21
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more highly evolved," tort-based strict products liability theory. 23
The Second Circuit concluded that there was no controlling
precedent in the New York Court of Appeals and certified the
following questions to the Court of Appeals:
(1) whether the strict products liability and the breach of
implied warranty claims are identical;
(2) whether, if the claims are different, the strict products
liability claim is broader than the implied warranty claim
and encompasses the latter; and
(3) whether, if the claims are different and a strict liability
claim may fail while an implied warranty claim succeeds,
the jury's finding of no product defect is reconcilable with
its finding of a breach of warranty. 24
Responding to the certified questions, a six-to-one majority of
the Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Titone, held that in
a products liability case a strict liability claim is not identical to a
breach of implied warranty claim, and that the latter is not
necessarily subsumed by the former.2 The court attributed the
distinction in the claims to their "differing etiology and doctrinal
underpinnings."26 Upon tracing the development of these claims,
the court concluded that the breach of implied warranty claim
originated in contract law and focuses on the purchaser's
disappointed expectations, whereas the more recently developed
strict products liability claim originated in tort law and focuses on
"social policy and risk allocation by means other than those
27
dictated by the market place."
The court held that despite a "high degree of overlap" in the
substance of the two claims-often asserted together in an actionthe core element of "defect" is "subtly different" in the two
claims? 8 According to the court, "defect" for strict products
23 Id.
24

Id., see also Denny, 42 F.3d at 111-12.

87
265Deiny,
Id.at 259,

N.Y.2d at 263, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256.

27

Id.

2

Id. at 256, 662 N.E.2d at 734, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 254-55.
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liability for design defect requires a "weighing of the product's
dangers against its over-all advantages"--a "negligence-inspired"
approach known as risk-utility analysis.29
By contrast, "the
UCC's concept of a 'defective' product requires an inquiry only
into whether the product in question was 'fit for the ordinary
purposes for which such goods are used."

30

Thus, Denny reaffirmed that, under New York law, a strict
liability claim for defective design is determined by a risk-utility
analysis.3 1 Under risk-utility analysis, the product as designed is
"not reasonably safe" if, assuming the design defect was known
at the time of manufacture, a reasonable person would conclude

that the product's utility did not outweigh the risk inherent in
marketing a product designed in that manner.32 A plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case by showing that the defendant
marketed a product designed so that it was "not reasonably safe"
and that the defective design was a substantial factor in causing
the plaintiffs injury. 33 The defendant, on the other hand, may
Id. at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 735-36, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255-56.
Id. (quoting N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c)).
Under UCC § 2-314, a
warranty that goods shall be "merchantable" is implied in a contract for the
sale of goods if the seller is a "merchant with respect to goods of that kind."
Id.
"' Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 257, 662 N.E.2d at 735, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255;see
also Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983).
32 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 257, 662 N.E.2d at 735, 639 N.Y.S.2d
at 255; see
also Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 108, 450 N.E.2d at 208, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 402. In a
risk-utility analysis, the jury should consider such factors as:
(1) the product's utility to the public as a whole; (2)
its utility to the individual user; (3) the likelihood that the
product will cause injury; (4) the availability of a safer
design; (5) the possibility of designing and manufacturing the
product so that it is safer but remains functional and
reasonably priced; (6) the degree of awareness of the
product's potential danger that can reasonably be attributed to
the injured user; and (7) the manufacturer's ability to spread
the cost of any safety-related design changes.
Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 257, 662 N.E.2d at 735, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255 (citing
Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 109, 450 N.E.2d at 208-09, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 402-03).
33 Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 107, 450 N.E.2d at 208, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
29

31
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present evidence demonstrating that the product is a safe one,
i.e., "one whose utility outweighs its risks when the product has
been designed so that the risks are reduced to the greatest extent
possible while retaining the product's inherent usefulness at an
acceptable cost."34
But, Denny establishes, on the other hand, that a breach of
implied warranty claim is determined under "consumer
expectations" analysis. 35 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
by showing that the product was not reasonably fit, and that the
product was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury. 36
Unfortunately, the Denny majority did little to define the
parameters of the consumer expectations analysis. The court did
explain, however, that the test "focuses on the expectations for
the performance of the product when used in the customary, usual
and reasonably foreseeable manners." 37 Such a claim, the Denny
court further explained, is one involving true "strict" liability,
since recovery may be had upon a showing that the product was
not minimally safe for its expected purpose-without regard to the

I Id. The Derny court explained that risk-utility analysis has become
"functionally synonymous" to traditional negligence analysis:
The adoption of this risk/utility balance as a
component of the 'defectiveness' element has brought the
inquiry in design defect cases closer to that used in traditional
negligence cases, where the reasonableness of an actor's
conduct is considered in light of a number of situational and
policy-driven factors. While efforts have been made to steer
away -from the fault-oriented negligence principles by
characterizing the design defect cause of action in terms of a
product-based rather than a conduct-based analysis, the
reality is that the risk/utility balancing test is a
'negligence-inspired' approach, since it invites the parties to
adduce proof about the manufacturer's choices and ultimately
requires the fact finder to make 'a judgment about [the
manufacturer's] judgment.'
Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 257-58, 662 N.E.2d at 735, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255
(citations omitted).
31 See Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
36 Id. See also Finkelstein v. Chevron Chem. Co., 60 A.D.2d 640, 641, 400
N.Y.S.2d 548, 549 (2d Dep't 1977).
37 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d
at 258-59, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
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feasibility of alternative designs or the manufacturer's
"reasonableness" in marketing it in that unsafe condition.38
Thus, in theory, the focus in a breach of warranty claim is not
the designer's conduct (as in a negligence claim) nor whether
there were safer designs available (an inquiry integral to a strict
products liability claim), but whether the product was "fit" for its
ordinary purposes.
Importantly, the Denny court noted that the theoretical
distinction between the claims "may have little or no effect in
most cases. ,39 The facts in Denny, however, supported
submission of both claims to the jury and the opposing verdicts
on the breach of implied warranty and strict liability claims. As
the court explained, under the strict liability claim, the fact finder
was required to determine whether the Bronco II's value as an
off-road vehicle outweighed the risk of rollover accidents during
other driving uses. In this respect, Ford argued that the design
features (i.e., high center of gravity, relatively narrow track
width, short wheel base, and special suspension system) were
necessary to effective off-road travel; Ford's proof was relevant
to the strict products liability risk/utility analysis. On the other
hand, the plaintiffs' proof focused on Ford's marketing and sale
of the Bronco II for "suburban and city driving," and on the
Bronco II's design characteristics that made it unusually
susceptible to rollover when used on paved roads. The court
viewed plaintiffs' evidence as sufficient to show that the
"ordinary purpose" for which the Bronco II was sold was
"routine highway and street driving" and that it was not "fit" or
"safe" for that purpose. 40 The court was persuaded that the
"nature of the proof and the way in which the fact issues were
litigated" demonstrated "how the two causes of action can
diverge. ',' Thus, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
conclude both that the Bronco II's "utility as an off-road vehicle
outweighed the risk of injury resulting from rollover accidents
38

Id.

39 Id. at 262, 662 N.E.2d at 738, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
40

Id. at 263, 662 N.E.2d at 738, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258.

41 Id.
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and that the vehicle was not safe for the 'ordinary purpose' of
daily driving for which it was marketed and sold." 42 The court
explained:
[W]hat makes this case distinctive is that the 'ordinary
purpose' for which the product was marketed and sold to
the plaintiff was not the same as the utility against which
It is these unusual
the risk was to be weighed.
circumstances that give practical significance to the
ordinarily theoretical difference between the defect
concepts in tort and statutory breach of implied warranty
causes of action.43
B. The Denny Dissent
The decision has not been without criticism." Foremost is
Judge Simons' vigorous dissent. Judge Simons concluded that a
strict products liability claim for defective design is substantively
broader than and encompassed a breach of implied warranty
claim. 45 He reasoned that, despite the claims' differing historical
origins, in a personal injury action "[b]oth causes of action are
torts and defectiveness for both should be determined by the same
standard," namely a risk-utility analysis. 46 Moreover, in his
view, a consumer expectations analysis is appropriate to
commercial sales transactions, but "has no place in personal
.injury litigation alleging a design defect and may result in
42 Id.

41 Id. at 263, 662 N.E.2d at 738-39, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59.

"See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A Behrens, An Unhappy Return to
Confusion in the Common Law of Products Liability-Denny v. Ford Motor

Company Should Be Overturned, 17 PACE L. REv. 359 (1997) (arguing that
the Denny opinion misunderstands the application of implied warranty claim to
personal injury action alleging design defect, imposes "absolute liability under
a hazy, undefined implied warranty theory," and is "out of step" with public
policy approaches of other jurisdictions).
45 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 264, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259
(Simons, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 264-65, 662 N.E.2d at 739-40, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259-60 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

9

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1999], Art. 19

TOURO LAWREVIEW

744

imposing

absolute

liability

on marketers

[Vol 15
of consumers'

products."4 7

He viewed consumer expectations as valuable only
as a factor in determining the reasonableness of alternative
designs or the public's perception of the product.4 " Judge Simons
would have held that the jury's finding of "defect" for the strict

liability claim was not reconcilable with its finding of "defect"
for the breach of implied warranty claim.

III. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS ANALYSIS
A majority of courts and scholars agree with Judge Simons'

conclusion

that a consumer

expectations

analysis

is

not

appropriate for products liability claims based on defective

design, at least as an exclusive test independent of risk-utility
analysis. 4"

Indeed, the recently adopted Restatement Third

rejects consumer expectations as an "independent standard for
Instead, it
judging defectiveness of product designs. ' 50
recognizes that "the nature and strength of consumer expectations
Id. at 264, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
48 Id. at 264-65, 662 N.E.2d at 739-40, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259-60 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
49 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmts. f, g. &
reporters' note to cmt. d, II, III (1998) (hereinafter "Restatement Third"); see
also James A. Henderson & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on
Defective Products Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879-87 (1998)
(hereinafter "Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus") (discussing and
concluding that in design defect cases, consumer expectations analysis is an
"inappropriate" standard and risk-utility analysis is the "only sensible"
standard); Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV.
593, 611-18 (1980) (criticizing use of a consumer expectations test, either
alone or in conjunction with risk-utility analysis). See also Castro v. QVC
Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases
indicating that certain states define design defect only by risk-utility analysis,
others only by consumer expectations analysis, others by a "modified"
consumer expectations test that incorporates risk-utility factors into consumer
expectations analysis, and still others by both risk-utility and consumer
expectations analysis).
5o Restatement Third § 2, cmt. g.
17

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss2/19

10

Ausili: Denny v. Ford

1999

DENNY V FORD

745

regarding the product, including expectations arising from
product portrayal and marketing" is a factor in determining
whether an alternative design is reasonable. 51 As the reporters'
note to the Restatement Third explains:
[C]onsumer expectations about product performance and
the dangers attendant to product use affect how risks are
perceived and relate to foreseeability and frequency of
the risks of harm, both of which are relevant under
Subsection (b) [i.e., strict liability claim for defective
design]. Such expectations are often influenced by how
products are portrayed and marketed and can have a
significant impact on consumer behavior.
Thus,
although consumer expectations do not constitute an
independent standard for judging the defectiveness of
product designs, they may substantially influence or even
be ultimately determinative on risk-utility balancing in
judging whether the omission of a proposed alternative
design renders the product not reasonably safe.52
Nevertheless, in New York, consumer expectations analysis is
recognized as an independent test for breach of implied warranty.
Although Denny seemingly revitalized the claim and the
consumer expectations analysis, the majority opinion provided
little guidance for applying the consumer expectations analysis to
the facts of a case. Indeed, Judge Simons faulted the majority for
"not attempt[ing] to define the consumer expectation standard"
which he concluded is "unworkable" in design defect cases.5 3
For instance, the majority did not specify whether subjective,

51 Id. § 2, cmt. f. See also Henderson & Twerski, Achieving Consensus, 83
CORNELL L. REv. at 879-82 (concluding that consumer expectations fail as a
standard for defective design independent from risk-utility analysis).
52 Restatement Third § 2, cmt. g (citation omitted).
13 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 264, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259
(Simons, J., dissenting).
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objective, or a combination subjective/objective expectations are
the appropriate measure.54
The majority did, however, offer significant clarification of the
scope of the implied warranty of merchantability in footnote 4 of
the opinion: "A warranty of fitness for ordinary purposes 'does
not mean that the product will fulfill [a] buyer's every
such a warranty
expectation.' Rather, it has been observed,
'provides for a minimal level of quality."' 55
A review of the Skelton case, cited by the majority in Denny,
was not a personal injury action for defective design and offers
only slightly more guidance in understanding the scope of the
implied warranty of merchantability in a design defect case for
personal injury. In Skelton, car purchasers sought relief under
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act for defendant's alleged undisclosed substitution
of automobile transmissions. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,
that the substituted transmissions were "more expensive to
maintain" and "less desirable to the purchasing public than [the
original transmissions]."56 In dismissing an implied warranty of
merchantability claim, the court initially observed that the
warranty "does not impose a general requirement that goods
precisely fulfill the expectations of the buyer. Instead, it provides
for a minimum level of quality." 57 As applied to automobiles, the
court quoted an Illinois appellate court's observation in a case
where a transmission fell out of a car on one occasion and the
4 Cf. Solow v. Wellner, 205 A.D.2d 339, 613 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1st Dep't
1994) (applying reasonable objective consumer expectations to implied
warranty of habitability claim, noting that both the common law and statutory
remedies for the implied warranty of habitability were not intended to
correspond to "subjective contractual expectations analogous to the warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose in sales cases (UCC 2-315), but to objective
expectations akin to the warranty of merchantability (UCC 2-314)"), aff'd, 86
N.Y.2d 582, 658 N.E.2d 1005, 635 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1995).
" Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 259, 662 N.E.2d at 736, N.Y.S.2d at 256 n.4 (citing
and quoting 1 White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 9-8, at 476
(Practitioner's 3d ed.); Skelton v. General Motors Corp., 500 F. Supp. 1181,
1191 (N.D. Ill. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 660 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1981)).
56 Skelton, 500 F. Supp. at 1192.
57 Id. at 1191-92.
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brakes failed on another: "Fitness for the ordinary purpose of
driving implies that the vehicle should be in a safe condition and
substantially free of defects. It should be obvious that any car
without an adequate transmission and proper brakes is not fit for
the ordinary purpose of driving." 5 8 By comparison, the court
found the plaintiffs' allegations of substituted transmissions were
insufficient to constitute breach of implied warranty, "since they
do not suggest that the cars were unfit for driving or below a
minimally acceptable standard of quality. "9
Denny and Castro indicate, however, that significant
considerations in determining consumer expectations are how the
product was portrayed and marketed. Other potential indications

of reasonable consumer expectations, and sources for determining
i.e., minimally safe,
whether a product is "merchantable,"
include government standards and regulations and the

11 Id. (quoting Overland Bond & Investment Corp. v. Howard, 9 ll.App.3d
348, 292 N.E.2d 168, 172-73 (1st Dist. 1972)).
59 Id.at 1191-92. See also McDermott v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 94-5405
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 1998) (dismissing breach of implied warranty claim for
defective design in action by victims of Long Island Railroad massacre against
manufacturers of gun, magazine, and bullets used by shooter because
allegations insufficient to demonstrate that products were not reasonably fit for
their ordinary purposes). Before Denny, lower New York courts recognized
the applicability of the consumer expectation test to a breach of implied
warranty of merchantability claim for personal injury involving certain
products, such as food impurity cases. See, e.g., Langiulli v. Bumble Bee
Seafood, Inc., 159 Misc. 2d 450, 604 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1021 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1993) (adopting "reasonable expectation" standard to
implied warranty of merchantability claim rather than "foreign/natural" test in
action by consumer who broke tooth when he bit tuna bone in can of tuna; in
denying motion to dismiss claim, holding that liability for a breach of warranty
is established "where the consumer is injured by conditions which he could not
have reasonably anticipated to be present in the product purchased.'"); cf.
Stark v. Chock Full O'Nuts, 77 Misc.2d 553,554, 356 N.Y.S.2d 403, 404
(N.Y. App. Term 1974) (adopting "reasonable expectation" test for breach of
implied warranty of fitness under N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-315). Such cases.
however, are akin to manufacturing defect cases. Cf. Restatement Third § 7
(adopting reasonable consumer expectations to determine manufacturing defect
incommercially distributed food).
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characteristics of goods of the same class manufactured by one
other than the defendant.6o
IV.

THE "DUAL PURPOSE" REQUIREMENT: CASTRO V.

QVC

NETWORK, INC.

Thus, after Denny, it remains that under New York law a
products liability action may be based on one or more of four
theories: negligence, breach of express warranty, breach of
implied warranty, or strict liability. 61 Denny demonstrates that a
fact finder could, under appropriate circumstances, conclude that
a design defect is not actionable in tort, because the product's
utility outweighs the risk of injury, but is actionable in contract,
because the product was not "fit" or "safe" for the "ordinary
purpose" for which it was marketed and sold. Determining when
the distinction has a practical "effect" in a case is an important
question for lawyers (and clients). In other words, counsel must
be able to establish and argue the existence (or absence) of
circumstances demonstrating that the two causes of action are to
be treated as separate, thereby allowing (or precluding)
presentation of both to the fact finder. A recent Second Circuit
opinion (in a case where the distinction had an effect) provides
some guidance. 62
In Castro, the plaintiffs, Loyda Castro and her husband,
brought a diversity action in federal court against the
manufacturer and seller of an allegedly defective roasting pan that
injured Mrs. Castro, asserting claims for strict liability and
breach of implied warranty of merchantability. 63 Trial was held
o Id. See also McDermott v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., No. 94-5405 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 17, 1998) (dismissing breach of implied warranty claim for defective

design in action by victims of Long Island Railroad massacre against
manufacturers of gun, magazine, and bullets used by shooter because
allegations insufficient to demonstrate that products were not reasonably fit for
their ordinary purposes).
61 See Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204,
463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983).
62 See Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 1998).
63Id. at 115.
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in September 1995, three months before the New York Court of
Appeals' opinion in Denny.
In early November 1993, defendant QVC Network, Inc.
("QVC"), operator of a cable television home-shopping channel,
The
advertised the "T-Fal Jumbo Resistal Roaster". '
advertisement was put on in a one-day Thanksgiving promotion
with the pan's manufacturer, defendant U.S.A. T-Fal Corp.
("T-Fal").6 When QVC and T-Fal agreed to the Thanksgiving
promotion, T-Fal did not produce a pan large enough to roast a
turkey.66 T-Fal, therefore, asked its parent company, located in
France, to provide a suitable roasting pan. 6' The parent company
provided a "roasting" pan by adding two small handles to a pan
originally designed without handles and for other purposes, and
T-Fal shipped the roasting pan to QVC for the Thanksgiving
promotion. 61
Mrs. Castro bought the roasting pan from QVC and used it to
cook a 20-lb. turkey on Thanksgiving Day in 1993.69 She was
injured as she removed the turkey and roasting pan from the
oven. 70 She testified that she took the pan out of the oven using
insulated mittens by gripping the pan's handles using the first two
fingers on each hand which was the maximum grip allowed by
the small handles. 71 "As the turkey tipped toward her, she lost
control of the pan, spilling hot drippings and fat" on her foot and
ankle, causing serious burns.7
At trial, the district court rejected the plaintiffs' request to
charge the jury separately on strict liability and breach of implied
warranty, finding the two claims identical under the
circumstances. 73 The district court, therefore, instructed the jury
64 Id.

65Id.
6 Id.at 115 n.1.
67 Idat 115.
6 id.
69 Id.
70id.

71Id.

72Id. at 115-16.

73Id. at 116.
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only on the strict liability claim. 74 The jury found for the
defendants. 75
Plaintiffs motion for a new trial was pending when the Court of
Appeals decided Denny.76 The district court concluded that the
breach of implied warranty and strict products liability claims
were identical under the circumstances and denied the motion. 77
The plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Calabresi, held that under New York law the jury should
have been instructed separately on each claim. 78 Accordingly, the
Second Circuit reversed the order denying a new trial and
remanded for a new trial on the breach of implied warranty
claim.79

The Second Circuit determined that the case presented
"precisely the situation" that Denny held sufficient to warrant
separate charges on strict liability and breach of implied warranty
claims.8" That is, a situation where "the 'ordinary purpose' for
which the product was marketed and sold to the plaintiff was not
the same as the utility against which the risk was to be
weighed."'"
The Second Circuit interpreted Denny as
establishing a "dual purpose" requirement, which determines
when the two claims "might meld and when, instead, they are to
be treated as separate," i.e., when a jury must be charged on both
strict liability and breach of implied warranty.82 Where a "dual
purpose" exists, the Second Circuit explained, "a product's
overall benefits might outweigh its overall risks [but that] does
not preclude the possibility that consumers may have been misled
74Id.
75 Id.
76

Id.

77 Id.

Id. at 115, 119.
71 Id at 119-20. The breach of implied warranty claim is expected to be tried
78

later this year.
80 Id. at 119.
81 Denny v. Ford Motor Company, 87 N.Y.2d 248, 259, 662 N.E.2d 730,
736, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 (1995).
82

Castro v. QVC Network, Inc., 139 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1998).
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into using3 the product in a context in which it was dangerously
unsafe. "

In the Second Circuit's view, the jury could have reached a
verdict for the plaintiffs on the breach of implied warranty claim,
notwithstanding the contrary verdict on the strict liability claim,
because the purpose for which the pan was sold to Mrs. Castro
(i.e., cooking heavy food) was different from the purpose
considered in the risk-utility analysis (i.e., cooking "low-volume"
food). The court considered the evidence sufficient for a jury to
find that, although the pan was originally manufactured and sold
in France as a multiple-use product for low-volume cooking, it
was marketed and sold to Mrs. Castro as suitable for cooking a
25-lb turkey. Specifically, the plaintiffs introduced at trial a
"videotape of a QVC representative demonstrating to a television
audience that the pan," while suitable for "low-volume" foods
(such as casseroles, cutlets, and cookies), was also suitable for
cooking a 25-lb. Turkey."" T-Fal added handles to the pan in
order to fill QVC's request for a roasting pan that it could use in
its Thanksgiving promotion."' Thus, on the strict liability claim,
the risk-utility analysis entailed weighing the pan's utility as a
low-volume cooking pan against the risk of injury when cooking
heavy food, such as a 20-lb. turkey. While the jury apparently
found that the "roasting pan's overall utility for cooking
low-volume foods outweighed the risk of injury when cooking
heavier foods," it could have found that the product was "unsafe
for the purpose for which it was marketed and sold-roasting a
twenty-five pound turkey-and, as such, was defective under the
consumer expectations test." 6 Under these circumstances, the
plaintiffs were entitled to a separate charge on the breach of
implied warranty claim?

8

Id.

94Id. at 119
8 Id.
86

Td.

8 Id.
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V. ESTABLISHING DUAL PURPOSE
Denny and Castro involved defendants that marketed and sold
their products to be used in a manner or for a purpose other than
that for which the products were designed. The "dual purpose"
requirement was satisfied, giving practical distinction to the
breach of implied warranty and strict liability claims, and
supporting submission of both claims to a jury. Although Denny
seemingly revitalized the breach of implied warranty claim, the
theoretical distinction appears rarely to have had practical effect
in cases, either because the circumstances satisfying "dual
purpose" arise infrequently or because plaintiffs' lawyers have
not had sufficient opportunities or need to demonstrate such a
distinction.88
Nevertheless, plaintiff's counsel should be prepared to establish
and argue the existence of a "dual purpose," as in Denny and
Castro. The key, as the Court of Appeals stated in Denny, is
"the nature of the proof and the way in which the fact issues [are]
litigated." 89
Despite the strictures of this "dual purpose"
requirement, the Denny case invites creative and strategic
thinking by plaintiff's counsel pursuing both a strict liability
claim and a breach of warranty claim--with its revitalized
emphasis on consumer expectations. The Denny and Castro cases
illustrate how marketing and advertising materials may be integral
to distinguishing breach of implied warranty and strict products
liability claims. Establishing the practical distinction begins when
investigating the case and drafting the complaint, and carries
See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Morflo Indus., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (dismissing breach of implied warranty claim in products liability action
for defective design of water heater on defendants' summary judgment motion
because, among other reasons, court had dismissed strict liability claim based
on risk-utility analysis and no dual purpose existed); Wyda v. Makita Elec.
Works, Ltd., 232 A.D.2d 407, 408, 648 N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (2d Dep't 1996)
(dismissing breach of implied warranty claim found "coextensive" to strict
liability claim in action by worker injured using saw, where court dismissed
strict liability claim based on substantial material alteration to saw by
plaintiff's
employer, who removed safety feature on saw blade).
89 Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 738, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
88
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through discovery and trial. Plaintiff's counsel's investigation
and discovery should focus not only on documents and materials
constituting the marketing and advertising but also on documents
and materials that merely shed light on the marketing and
advertising that may have influenced consumer expectations.
Examples of relevant marketing and advertising material are the
Ford marketing manual in Denny and the television advertisement
in Castro. Another example in Castro is a "sell sheet" prepared
by T-Fal describing for QVC salespersons the characteristics and
uses of the "roasting" pan; these uses included cooking various
low-volume foods, such as cake, lasagna, and stuffed potatoes,
but also a 25-1b. turkey. The Second Circuit explained that
"[w]hile the 'sell-sheet' was an internal document, and therefore,
could not have influenced .consumer expectations, it does shed
light on the meaning of the videotaped commercial. "9o
In establishing dual purpose, counsel should carefully scrutinize
marketing and advertising related material to determine whether
they have influenced consumer expectations or are relevant to
interpreting the marketing and advertising materials. Plaintiff's
counsel's discovery, in this regard, should focus on pre-sale,
point-of-sale, and even post-sale documents and materials.
Counsel should not forget to request any "drafts" of relevant
material. Relevant pre-sale material may include advertising
material (e.g., print literature, radio transcriptions, and television
video), catalogues, brochures, descriptive literature, promotional
materials, and sales training materials. Focus group studies by or
for the manufacturer or seller may also provide insight about
consumer expectations for the product. Relevant point-of-sale
material may include instruction manuals, training materials, and
stickers, labels, and tags. Relevant post-sale material may
include customer complaints to the manufacturer, seller, or a
government agency, and other lawsuits.
Defendant's counsel, on the other hand, should be prepared to
argue that no "dual purpose" exists under the circumstances. The
determination depends on the evidence presented and how
narrowly or broadly the court construes the "purposes" of the
90 Castro, 139 F.3d at 119 n.10.
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product for the risk-utility and consumer expectations analyses.
For example, in Castro, the defendants argued unsuccessfully, on
appeal, that "[t]he roaster had only a single purpose which was to
be a vessel for cooking." 9 1

The Second Circuit rejected the

argument, concluding that the defendants' argument
misses the point of the dual purpose test. Indeed, the same
argument could have been made in the Denny case: that the
Ford Bronco II had a single purpose, namely driving.
What characterizes both of these cases, however, is that
there was evidence before the jury of the 'dual purposes' to
which the products could be put.92
Obviously, defendant's counsel does not have to wait until trial
(by motion for a directed verdict or judgment as a matter of law)
to challenge a breach of implied warranty claim. Summary
judgment may be appropriate for eliminating the claim.93
For example, in Gonzalez v. Morflo Industries, Inc. ,94 an infant
plaintiff and his mother sued the manufacturers of an alleged
defective water heater and temperature control device for injuries
sustained when the infant was scalded by hot tap water in a bath
tub after being left unattended. 95 The plaintiffs asserted, among
other claims, design defect claims based on negligence, strict
liability, and breach of warranty.96 On the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
strict liability claim because the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that the products were "not reasonably safe"
under a risk-utility analysis.97 In this regard, the plaintiffs
argued, inter alia, that the water heater was "not reasonably
Id. at 119 n.ll.
I'
92

Id.

9 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Morflo Indus., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Wyda v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 232 A.D.2d 407, 408, 648
N.Y.S.2d 154, 155 (2d Dep't 1996).
9 931 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
91 Id. at 162.
96 Id. at 163.
97 Id. at 165-67.
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safe" because it was designed to raise the water temperature to a
dangerously high level (between 130 and 140 degrees
Fahrenheit), the utility of which did not justify the risk of
injury." The court disagreed, concluding that no rational jury
could find the water heater defective. The court found that the
plaintiffs failed to offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate (1) a
feasible alternative design; (2) the lack of utility associated with
the heater's ability to raise the water temperature to a level which
could scald the human body (noting defendants showed utility in
uses other than the bath, such as use in residential appliances); (3)
a likelihood of the type of harm suffered; and (4) that the general
public is unaware of or unable to avoid the dangers of hot water
(noting the dangers could readily have been anticipated and
eliminated with ordinary care). 99 Thus, the court concluded that
no rational jury could find that the risk of harm from the design
of the products outweighed the utility of having a heater that
raised the water temperature to over 120 degrees. 110 Accordingly,
the court dismissed the strict liability claim for defective design
of the water heater.
The court then dismissed the breach of warranty claim because
no "dual purpose" was shown and, alternatively, because plaintiff
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
water heater was fit for the ordinary purpose for which it was
used. 101 The court stated:
[A 'dual purpose'] case presents itself infrequently; it
requires a showing that the 'ordinary purpose' for which
the product was sold and marketed is not the same as the
purpose that provides the utility that outweighs the risk of

injury.102

98Id. at 164.
99

Id. at 164 (citing Fallon v. Clifford B. Hannay & Son. Inc., 153 A.D.2d

95, 550 N.Y.S.2d 135 (3d. Dep't 1989).
1 Id. at 167.
00
101 Id.
102
Id.
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These circumstances are not present in this case. The
ordinary purpose of the Morflo water heater was to heat
water for residential use -- for bathing and for residential

appliances. Using the Morflo heater to heat more than just
bath water was the 'ordinary purpose' of the heater. As
discussed earlier, plaintiffs do not adequately set forth
evidence to rebut defendants' claim that there was utility
associated with the heater's ability to raise the temperature
of water to a level which could scald the human body.
Moreover, this heater performed in the exact manner in
which it was expected to perform when it was used in the
customary, usual, and reasonably foreseeable manner. For
this reason, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the Morflo water heater was fit for the ordinary
purpose for which it was used." 10 3
VI. FEASIBLE ALTERNATIVE DESIGN

The most important distinction between the strict liability and
breach of implied warranty claims for defective design--and a

distinction that should raise concerns particularly for defendants-is that the plaintiff need not prove a feasible (or reasonable)

alternative design to establish a breach of implied warranty.
Under strict liability, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a
feasible alternative design.
Under risk-utility analysis, an
alternative design is reasonable if, in essence, its marginal
benefits exceed its marginal costs. As Denny emphasized, under

a breach of warranty claim, the focus is not on whether there
were safer designs available, but whether the product was "fit"

for its ordinary purposes."° To recover, the plaintiff must show
that the product was "not minimally safe" for its expected

purpose, regardless of the feasibility of making the product safer,
with the inquiry focusing on the "expectations for the

103id.
104

Denny v. Ford Motor Company, 87 N.Y.2d 248, 259, 662 N.E.2d 730,

736, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 256 (1995).
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performance of the product" when used in the customary, usual

and reasonably foreseeable manners.'5
Thus, a plaintiff may prevail on the claim even if the plaintiff is
unable to offer evidence of a feasible alternative design. A
defendant's uneasiness with this standard is understandable,
particularly where an alternative design would reduce one risk but

create a high probability of incurring another, greater risk.
VII. MANUFACTURING DEFECT CASES

In manufacturing defect cases, the plaintiff, by definition,
charges that the product is "defective" because it does not
conform to the manufacturer's specifications and standards, for
example, because of physical flaw or incorrect assembly.'06 If
such circumstances (and causation) are proven, then claims based
on strict liability and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability both impose liability irrespective of fault and
risk-utility balancing. As recognized in the Restatement Third:
"Products that malfunction due to manufacturing defects

disappoint reasonable expectations of product performance."

7

In such a case, there would be no practical effect to the
distinction between a strict liability claim and a breach of implied

warranty of merchantability claim. ' Thus, Denny's reasoning
appears not to apply in a manufacturing defect case.
105
Id.
1o1 See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 127, 417 N.E.2d 545,
552, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 258 (1981).
10
7 Restatement Third § 2, cmt. a.
1o See id. § 2, cmt. n "In connection with manufacturing defects, a § 2(a)
tort claim [i.e., a strict tort claim for manufacturing defect] and an implied
warranty of merchantability claim rest on the same factual predicate-the sale
by the defendant of a product that departs from the manufacturer's
specifications irrespective of anyone's fault. Thus, these two claims are
duplicative and may not be pursued together in the same case."; see also
Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 262, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 263 (Simons,
J., dissenting). "[A] consumer may reasonably expect a product to be made in
accordance with the manufacturer's standards and expect to be compensated
for injuries resulting from the manufacturer's failure to meet them. The
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VIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

A four-year statute of limitations applies to breach of warranty
claims under N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(1). 109 The limitations period

begins to run on tender of delivery (except where the warranty
explicitly extends to future performance).,0
The statute of
limitations may begin to run on different dates as to each
defendant in the distributive chain. "
By contrast, CPLR § 21412 generally imposes a three-year
statute of limitations on negligence and strict products liability
claims for injury to person or property, with the limitations
period running from the date of injury subject to various
exceptions based on the nature of the product. "3 These periods
apply to the respective claims even when they are both asserted in
the same action. Accordingly, a limitations bar to one claim will
not affect the other.
IX.

SAMPLE JURY CHARGE AND VERDICT SHEET

A. Sample Jury Charge

A sample charge for breach of implied warranty is found in
New York Pattern Jury Instructions:

PJI 2:142. Liability for Breach of Implied Warranty

product is reasonably held defective because the manufacturer has not made
the product as it intended." Id.
"oUniform Commercial Code 2-275 (McKinney's 1992).
"0 Id. § 2-275(2); See Heller v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 64 N.Y. 2d 407,
409, 477 N.E.2d 434, 435, 488 N.Y.S.2d 132, 133 (1985).
..See id. at 411, 477 N.E.2d at 436, 488 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (holding that "a
cause of action against a manufacturer or distributor accrues on the date the
party charged tenders delivery of the product, not on the date that some third
party sells it to plaintiff.").
112N.Y.

C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney's 1997).

113See,

e.g., CPLR § 214-c (2) (special discovery rule for injury caused by
latent effects of exposure to any substance).
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The law implies a warranty by a manufacturer
(wholesaler, retailer) that places a product on the market
that it is reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such product is used. If the product is not reasonably fit to
be used for its ordinary purposes, the warranty is breached.
Plaintiff AB claims that Defendant CD's [state product]
was not fit for its ordinary purposes because [state claim].
If you find that the product was fit for its ordinary
purposes, you will find there was no breach of warranty,
and you will find for CD on this issue. If you find that the
[state product] was not fit for its ordinary purposes, you
will find that CD breached its implied warranty.
The charge is simple, based on the language of UCC § 2-314
and the Denny case. Notably, the proposed charge does not use
the word "defective." According to the charge commentary, this
omission is supposed to avoid confusion with the strict products
liability charge.
Defendant's counsel should urge the court to include in a
breach of implied warranty charge the "clarifying" language of
footnote 4 from the Denny opinion.
B. Sample Verdict Sheet
The verdict sheet is a must for the breach of implied warranty
claim. Based on the PJI charge, above, the verdict sheet should
contain the following two questions:
1. Did defendant CD breach its implied warranty in that its
product was not reasonably fit for its ordinary purposes?
Yes

No

If "Yes," go to question "2."
If "No," go to question "3."
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2.
Was defendant CD's breach of implied warranty a
substantial factor in causing plaintiff AB's injuries?
Yes

No

X. CONCLUSION

Whether one agrees or disagrees with the Denny opinion, a
consumer expectations analysis presently governs breach of
implied warranty claims under New York law. When both strict
liability and breach of implied warranty claims are both asserted
in an action for defective design, plaintiffs' counsel and
defendants' counsel must be prepared to establish and argue the
existence or absence of "dual purpose"--a circumstance which
gives practical effect to the theoretical distinction, between the
claims. Whether such circumstances rarely occur or whether
plaintiffs' counsel have not had sufficient opportunity or need to
demonstrate such a distinction remains to be seen.
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